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Does Product Market Competition Lead Firms to Decentralize? 
Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen
* 
There  is  a  widespread  sense  that  over  the  last  two  decades  firms  have  been  decentralizing 
decisions to employees further down the managerial hierarchy. Economists have developed a 
range of theories to account for delegation, but there is less empirical evidence, especially across 
countries. This has limited the ability to understand the phenomenon of decentralization. To 
address the empirical lacuna we have developed a research program to measure the internal 
organization  of  firms  -  including  their  decentralization  decisions  -  across  a  large  range  of 
industries and countries.  
In  this  paper  we  investigate  whether  greater  product  market  competition  increases 
decentralization. For example, tougher competition may make local manager’s information more 
valuable, as delays to decisions become more costly. Since globalization and liberalization have 
increased  the  competitiveness  of  product  markets,  one  explanation  for  the  trend  towards 
decentralization could be increased competition. Of course there are a range of other factors that 
may  also  be  at  play,  including  human  capital  (Eve  Caroli  and  John  Van  Reenen,  2001), 
information and communication technology (Timothy Bresnahan, Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin 
Hitt, 2002), culture (Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2009) and industrial composition. 
To tackle these issues we collected detailed information on the internal organization of 
firms across nations. The few datasets that exist are either from a single industry
1 or (at best) 
across many firms in a single country
2. We analyze data on almost 4,000 firms across twelve 
countries in Europe, North America and Asia. We find that competition does indeed seem to 
foster greater decentralization.    2 
I.  SOME THEORIES   
A number of papers such as Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), George Baker, Robert 
Gibbons and Kevin Murphy (1999), Canice Prendergast (2002) and Oliver Hart and John Moore 
(2004), consider the delegation decision in the context of an information-based approach. For 
example, Acemoglu et al. (2007) examine a model where a firm faces a choice over whether to 
adopt a new technology. The principal is the Central Head Quarters (CHQ) and the agent is the 
plant manager. The CHQ has a greater interest in maximizing the firm’s value than the manager, 
but  the  manager  has  greater  local  private  knowledge  than  the  CHQ.  Characteristics  of  the 
environment  that  increase:  (i)  the  value  of  local  information;  and  (ii)  the  congruence  of 
incentives between the CHQ and plant manager, will increase decentralization.  
How  does  competition  affect  this  trade  off?  There  are  several  reasons  to  expect  the 
relationship  between  competition  and  decentralization  to  be  positive.  First,  if  competition 
reduces the agency problem then delegation is more likely as incentives are more aligned. This 
could be because (i) managers work harder to avoid bankruptcy; (ii) competition fosters a greater 
sensitivity of profits to relative differences in managerial effort or (iii) if there are more firms 
then it is easier to implement yardstick competition.  
Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2009) emphasize the incentive 
to centralize to overcome within-firm spillovers. For example, when a firm has two plants selling 
separate substitutable products, local plant managers will tend to set a price that is too low from 
the firm’s perspective, as the cannibalization effect is not internalized. Tougher competition will 
make the loss from this cannibalization smaller though, as price cost margins fall. So long as 
there is some incentive to delegate because of local information advantages the incentive to 
decentralize rises as competition increases.   3 
There  are  also  competitive  forces  working  against  decentralization.  On  the 
incentives/agency side, greater competition may actually reduce managerial effort, as the smaller 
mark-ups mean that the incentive to exert greater managerial effort to raise firm profitability is 
blunted. This is a variety of the well-known “Schumpeterian” effect on innovation – lower quasi-
rents reduce incentives to take activities that lower marginal costs. On the information side, if 
competition increases the number of firms, then there will be more public information, so in the 
Acemoglu et al (2007) model the principal can learn from observing other firms and take more 
decisions directly.  
Ultimately, the effect of competition on decentralization is an empirical issue. To look at 
this question using our organizational data, we estimate models of the form: 
(1)        
 where COMP  is an indicator of product market competition for plant i in industry j in country c, 
is a vector of other controls (including country and industry dummies).   
II. DATA 
We collected data on almost 4,000 medium sized (100 to 5,000 employees) manufacturing firms 
across a dozen countries which we briefly describe here. 
II.A Measuring Decentralization: We investigated the decentralization of decision making from 
the CEO to the plant-manager. The plant-manager is the most senior person at the factory level, 
so their autonomy from the CEO, who is typically based in the corporate head quarters, is a 
natural  measure  decentralization.  To  quantify  this  we  measured  decentralization  along  four 
dimensions. First, how much capital investment could a plant manager undertake without prior 
authorization  from  the  corporate  headquarters?  Second,  how  much  control  does  the  plant 
manager have in hiring a new full-time permanent shopfloor employee? Third, how much control   4 
does the plant manager have over introducing new products? Fourth how much control does the 
manger have over sales and marketing decisions? These last three measures were scaled from a 
score of 1, defined as all decisions taken at the corporate headquarters, to a 5 defined as all 
decisions  taken  at  the  plant  (decentralization).  Since  the  scaling  may  vary  across  all  these 
questions, we converted all four measures to z-scores (mean zero, unit standard deviation) and in 
our baseline took the average of the four z-scores. We also collected information on management 
practices (following Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), the proportion of employees with college 
degrees, average hours worked and the gender and age breakdown. From the sample database we 
also have information for most firms on accounting variables like sales and capital stock. 
II.B Collecting Accurate Responses: To obtain truthful responses we took a number of steps. 
First,  the  survey  was  conducted  by  telephone  without  telling  the  managers  they  were  being 
scored  on  organizational  practices.  This  enabled  scoring  to  be  based  on  the  interviewer’s 
evaluation of the firm’s actual practices, rather than their aspirations, the manager’s perceptions 
or the interviewer’s impressions. To run this “blind” scoring we used open questions (i.e. “To 
hire  a  full-time  permanent  shop-floor  worker  what  agreement  would  your  plant  need  from 
corporate headquarters”?), rather than closed questions (i.e. “Can you hire workers without 
authority from corporate headquarters?”[yes/no]). Following the initial question the discussion 
would  continue  until  the  interviewer  can  make  an  accurate  assessment  of  the  firm’s  typical 
practices. For example, if the plant manager responded “It is my decision, but I need sign-off 
from corporate HQ.” the interviewer would ask “How often would sign-off typically be given?” 
and  “Can  you  give  me  any  examples  when  that  sign-off  has  not  been  given”.  Second,  the 
interviewers were not told anything about the firm’s financial information or performance in 
advance of the interview. Since the firms (median size 270 employees) are too small to attract   5 
much media coverage, this should mean the interviewers had no preconceptions about the firms 
before they interviewed them. Third, each interviewer ran 85 interviews on average, allowing us 
to  remove  interviewer  fixed  effects.  Fourth,  the  survey  instrument  was  targeted  at  plant 
managers, who are typically senior enough to have an overview of organizational practices but 
not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations. Fifth, we collected a detailed set of 
information on the interview process itself (e.g. local time of day), the manager (e.g. nationality), 
and on the interviewer. These survey metrics are used as “noise controls” to help reduce residual 
variation. Finally, to maximize comparability every interviewer also had the same initial three 
days  of  interview  training  to  ensure  a  common  interpretation  of  the  scoring  grid.  The  team 
operated from one location and interviewers surveyed firms across multiple countries, so for 
example, a French speaking interviewer would interview firms in France, the UK and the US. 
II.C. Descriptive Statistics: Intriguingly, we found that firms developing countries (Brazil, China 
and  India),  tended  to  be  the  most  centralized,  with  almost  all  major  decisions  taken  by  the 
owners in the corporate headquarters (see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2009). Japanese firms 
were also relatively centralized. In contrast, firms in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries 
(Canada, Germany, Sweden, UK and US) were relatively decentralized. The rest of Europe (e.g. 
France, Italy, and Poland) tended to be in the middle of the decentralization ranking.  
 
III. RESULTS 
Table  1  examines  the  association  between  decentralization  and  different  measures  of 
product market competition, revealing a robustly positive relationship. We use three different 
proxies for product market competition following Steve Nickell (1996) and Philippe Aghion et 
al. (2005).    6 
 
TABLE 1 – COMPETITION AND DECENTRALIZATION 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Import penetration  0.131*  0.183*         
(3 years lagged)  (0.050)  (0.073)         
Lerner Competition Index      5.705*  1.763*     
(2 years lagged)      (0.850)  (0.878)     
Number of Competitors          0.120*  0.093* 
(0="None", 1="1 to 4"; 2="5+")          (0.035)  (0.034) 
Plant Skills    0.080*    0.082*    0.083* 
Percent Employees with a College degree    (0.018)    (0.017)    (0.016) 
Firm Size    0.081*    0.068*    0.066* 
ln(Firm Employment)    (0.027)    (0.019)    (0.018) 
Plant Employment    0.125*    0.088*    0.086* 
Plant employees as a % of firm employment    (0.023)    (0.024)    (0.022) 
Foreign Multinational    0.131*    0.106*    0.115* 
Firm belongs to a foreign multinational    (0.048)    (0.041)    (0.042) 
Observations  2,508  2,508  3,698  3,698  3,698  3,698 
Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Notes: OLS estimates. * indicates that a coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. The dependent 
variable is the decentralization z-score index. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the same level as the competition 
measure. Controls include a dummy for a public listing, being an affiliate of a domestic multinational, and a full set of survey 
noise controls: interviewer dummies, interviewee controls, and time of day and week (see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 2009). 
 
The first measure is the degree of import penetration in the country by two-digit industry 
measured as the share of total imports over domestic production. This is constructed for the 5-
year period 1999-2003 to remove any potential contemporaneous feedback. The second is the   7 
country  by  three  digit  industry  Lerner  index  of  competition,  which  is  (1  –  profits/sales), 
calculated as the average across the entire firm level database (excluding the firms in the survey). 
Again,  this  is  constructed  for  the  5-year  period  2000-2004  to  remove  any  potential 
contemporaneous feedback
3.
 The third measure of competition is the manager’s response to the 
survey question on the number of competitors a firm faces, valued zero for “no competitors”, one 
for “between one and five competitors”, and two for “5 or more competitors”.  
Reassuringly, whichever measure of competition we use, we still find a very strong and 
robust relationship between more competition and greater levels of decentralization. In column 
(1),  higher  import  competition  is  positively  and  significantly  associated  with  greater 
decentralization. In column (2) we include controls for skills, size, multinational status, country 
and three-digit industry dummies and find this result appears to be robust to these additional 
explanatory variables. In terms of these other covariates, we find that larger firms and plants, 
especially  those  belonging  to  foreign  multinationals  are  more  likely  to  delegate,  potentially 
because of greater operational complexity and the importance of local knowledge. Plants with 
higher levels of human capital are more likely to be autonomous, presumably because more 
educated managers are better able to effectively run their own plants. Finally, in other recent 
work we have found that plants located in regions with higher trust and less hierarchical religions 
are also likely to be autonomous (see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 2009, for more analysis of 
these cultural issues)
4.  
In columns (3) and (4) we run an identical specification, but instead using the lagged 
industry-level (inverse) Lerner index as an alternative measure of competition. We again find a 
significant and positive association between competition and decentralization without and with 
the full set of controls. Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we run another similar specification using   8 
the plant manager’s own self reported measure of the perceived number of competitors. Again 
we find a positive and significant association with and without the full set of controls. This 
reveals that the more rivals a firm perceives it faces, the more decentralized it appears to be.  
In  summary,  we  find  a  highly  significant  and  robust  relationship  between  more 
competition and greater firm-level decentralization. The magnitude of these competition effects 
are also of economic as well as statistical significance. For example, in column (6) increasing the 
number of competitors from zero to five is associated with an increase in the decentralization 
index of about 0.2, equivalent to going from a relatively decentralized European country like 
Germany to a very decentralized country like the US. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
We have addressed the question of whether competition fosters delegation by assembling a new 
dataset on about 4,000 firms across 12 countries that measures the delegation of authority from 
Central Head Quarters to local plant managers. We find that competition is associated with a 
greater  degree  of  delegation.  This  suggests  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  move  towards 
decentralization over time in the developed countries may be due to increasing competition, 
possibly arising from more globalized product markets. It also implies that a reason for the 
greater centralization in less developed countries may be due to lower competitive intensity. 
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